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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Thies contends that the district court erred in denying his suppression 
motion because the police impermissibly extended their investigatory detention of him 
while awaiting the arrival of a drug detection dog. While he has conceded that he was 
properly detained initially, he asserts that the officers' original suspicions were quickly 
dispelled. Further, even though he was properly cited for driving on a suspended 
license, the officers took an unreasonable length of time to prepare a simple citation. 
In response, the State offers four arguments in support of the district court's 
order denying suppression. First, the State contends that officers were still investigating 
the original purpose of the detention when the drug dog arrived, so there was no 
improper extension of the stop. (Resp. Br., 9-11; see also Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Second, 
the State asserts that the officers did not take an inordinate amount of time to issue their 
citation for driving without privileges, especially in light of the confusion surrounding the 
original purpose of the detention. (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) Third, the State argues that 
"there was reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the purpose of the stop into a 
drug investigation .... " (Resp. Br., p.11 n.2.) Fourth, the State claims that even if the 
continued detention of Mr. Thies was improper, he cannot avail himself of the 
exclusionary rule because his vehicle would inevitably have been searched anyway. 
(Resp. Br., p.11 n.2.) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to respond to each of the State's 
arguments. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in 
Mr. Thies' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Thies' Motion to Suppress because Officer Vogt 
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention longer than necessary to 
effectuate the seizure, without his consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Thies' Motion To Suppress Because Officer 
Vogt Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer Than Necessary 
To Effectuate The Stop, Without His Consent, In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment Of 
The United States Constitution And Article I, § 17 Of The Idaho Constitution 
The State offers four arguments in support of the district court's order denying 
suppression of the evidence found in Mr. Thies' vehicle. For the reasons set forth fully 
below, these arguments are without merit. 
A Police Dispelled Their Suspicion Of Domestic Violence And/Or Malicious Injury 
To Property Long Before The Drug Detection Dog Arrived At The Scene 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thies argued that the district court's finding "that the 
officers' investigation of Mr. Thies for domestic violence and Ms. Price for malicious 
injury to property was not yet completed by the time the canine alerted on the vehicle 
was clearly erroneous," and that, in fact, the investigation into domestic violence and/or 
malicious injury to property had long since ceased by the time the drug dog arrived. 
(App. Br., p.11.) In response, the State argues, essentially, that just because the 
officers quickly learned that there was no evidence of any domestic violence or 
malicious injury to property, the officers need not have ceased their investigation. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.8, 9-11.) 
There are two flaws in the State's argument. First, implicit in the notion that, 
during an investigative detention, police must "diligently pursue[ ] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly," United States v. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (quoted in State v. Buti, 131 Idaho 793, 796-97 
(1998)), is the idea that once the officers' suspicions are dispelled, the investigative 
detention must cease, see, e.g., State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 47 4, 481-82 (Ct. App. 
4 
1999) ("[l]f the individual performs the field sobriety tests in such a manner as to dispel 
the officer's suspicions, absent other unique circumstances, the driver will be left to go 
on his or her way."). In this case, Officer Goodspeed had spoken to the 9-1-1 caller 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.84, L.8 - p.85, L.10), Officer Vogt had spoken to Mr. Thies (3/9/11 
Tr., p.85, L.14 - p.86, L.11 ), Officer Price had spoken to Ms. Price (Ex. 2, Officer Price 
Audio), and one or more of the officers had spoke to Ms. Price's children (see 10/18/10 
Tr., p.30, Ls.8-24; Ex. 2, Officer Price Audio, at 06:23 - 07:30; see also 3/9/11 Tr., p.82, 
Ls.13-20), and none of them, apparently, gave the officers any reason to believe that 
any crime of domestic violence had occurred, or that Ms. Price had engaged in a 
malicious injury to the 9-1-1 caller's vehicle. Accordingly, it was unreasonable to 
continue detaining Mr. Thies. 
Furthermore, even if the officers had some basis to continue investigating 
suspicions of domestic violence or malicious injury to property, the officers simply did 
not do so. Officer Price's audio recording reflects that he questioned Ms. Price for just a 
few minutes about possible domestic violence or malicious injury to property, but that he 
concluded his questions on these topics no more than fourteen minutes into the 
recording. (See generally Ex. 2, Officer Price Audio.) Furthermore, Officer Price's 
audio reflects that Ms. Price's children were brought out of their driver's education class 
to be questioned briefly by police, but were sent back to class just seven and one-half 
minutes into the recording. (See Ex. 2, Officer Price Audio, at 06:23 - 07:30.) In 
addition, although there is no comprehensive recording of Officer's Vogt's questioning of 
Mr. Thies, one of his recordings reflects that, while the officers were waiting for the drug 
dog to arrive, they did not question Mr. Thies at all in aid of a domestic violence or 
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malicious injury to property investigation; they simply tried to pressure him into admitting 
to possessing drugs or allowing them to search his vehicle for drugs. ( See generally 
Ex. 2, Officer Vogt Audio.) 1 Finally, Officer Vogt testified under oath that he had 
"dispelled concerns about the domestic violence situation" before the detention "turned 
into a drug investigation" and he "called for the dog" (10/19/10 Tr., p.24, Ls.9-20), which 
was approximately sixteen minutes before the drug dog actually arrived. (Compare Ex. 
2, Officer Price Audio at 14:06 (picking up Officer Vogt discussing the fact that the drug 
dog was en route) with Ex. 2, Officer Price Audio at 30:14 (revealing that the dog was 
on the scene). 
Although the officers may have wished to continue investigating questions of 
domestic violence and malicious injury to property, the record in this case reflects that 
they did not have any basis to detain Mr. Thies while they did so and, in fact, chose not 
to do so. Accordingly, such an investigation cannot now be used as an excuse for the 
officers to have continued detaining Mr. Thies while awaiting the drug dog. 
B. The Thirteen Minutes That Officer Vogt Claims To Have Spent Preparing A 
Simple Citation Was Unreasonable 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thies argued that it was unreasonable for Officer 
Vogt to have spent thirteen minutes preparing "a simple driving without privileges 
citation that he admitted he could probably complete in four to five minutes," and he 
suggested that Officer Vogt was really just using that time to wait for a drug dog so that 
he could confirm his hunch that Mr. Thies had drugs in his vehicle. (App. Br., pp.10-11.) 
In response, the State argues simply that thirteen minutes was not unreasonable in light 
1 There are two recordings created by Officer Vogt that are included in Exhibit 2. This 
reference is to the one with the file name beginning with "456f." 
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of the fact that Officer Vogt felt "there was a lot of stuff going on." (Resp. Br., p.9 
(quoting Officer Vogt).) 
In view of the facts of this case, the State's argument rings quite hollow. First, as 
was noted in Mr. Thies' Appellant's Brief (p.10), Officer Vogt admitted that he could 
finish a driving without privileges citation in as few as four or five minutes. (3/9/11 
Tr., p.128, Ls.4-8.) Second, it is uncontested that Officer Vogt did not even begin 
gathering some of the basic information he needed to write the citation during the 
relevant thirteen minutes; he did not begin gathering that information until after the drug 
dog had arrived and been deployed, and Mr. Thies' vehicle had been searched. (See 
3/9/11 Tr., p.128, L.9 - p.130, L.25 (testifying that the officers did not request 
information on Mr. Thies' vehicle and registration until 6:20 and 6:29 p.m., respectively, 
which would have been after the vehicle was searched, and that this information was 
necessary for a driving without privileges citation); Ex. 3 (dispatch log reflecting the 6:20 
and 6:29 requests for information).) Third, there is no evidence to suggest that Officer 
Vogt was otherwise occupied. Mr. Thies was handcuffed in the back of a police car by 
that time. (3/9/11 Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.5.) Ms. Price, who was accompanied by 
Officer Price, was by that time simply sitting around-mostly silently-waiting for the 
police to do something. (See Ex. 2, Officer Price Audio, at 14: 13 - 39:50.) And. 
Ms. Price's children had returned to their driver's education class. (See Ex. 2, Officer 
Price Audio, at 06:23 - 07:30.) Under these circumstances, Mr. Thies submits that it is 
clear that Officer Vogt dragged his feet on the citation in order to allow time for the drug 
dog to arrive. That was improper. See State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 9 (Ct. App. 
7 
2009) ("A drug dog sniff is not a search and may be done during an investigative stop, 
but the use of the drug dog may not lengthen the duration of the stop."). 
C. The State's Argument As To A Purported Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Of 
Drug Activity Is Not Properly Before This Court 
The State argues for the first time on appeal that, even if the continued detention 
of Mr. Thies was not permissible on the grounds argued below, it was permissible on 
the basis that "there was reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the purpose of the 
stop into a drug investigation based upon Thies' behavior and Officer Vogt's 
interpretation of that behavior in conjunction with Thies' criminal history (Tr., p.113, 
Ls.1-16.)" (Resp. Br., p.11 n.2.) The only authority cited by the State relates to the 
appellate court's ability to affirm a district court's decision on alternate grounds to those 
utilized by the district court. (See Resp. Br., p.11 n.2.) 
Mr. Thies submits that the State's new argument is improperly before this Court. 
The cited authority notwithstanding, Mr. Thies contends that, especially in the context of 
the Fourth Amendment (because it is the State that bears the burden of proving that a 
given warrantless search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995)), the State is not free 
to raise new arguments for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 
Idaho 509, 515 n.4 (2010) (identifying the rule that Idaho's appellate courts "will not 
consider issues not raised in the court below," and suggesting that that rule generally 
applies to the State when it is the respondent on appeal, just as it does to the 
defendant-appellant); State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 81-82 (2000) (rejecting the State's 
attempt to argue for the first time on a appeal that the defendant lacked "standing" to 
challenge the search of his wife's purse); State v. Reimer, 127 Idaho 214, 218-19 
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(1995) (rejecting the State's attempt to argue for the first time on appeal that the search 
of a mug was permissible under the inventory search exception to the warrant 
requirement). See also Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57 (2006) 
("Appellate court review is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were 
presented ... below.' Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments 
raised for the first time on appeal.") (citations omitted). Cf United States v. Jones, _ 
U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (rejecting the government's attempt to argue for the 
first time in the Supreme Court that placing a tracking device on a vehicle was lawful 
because the officers possessed probable cause to believe that the defendant was 
"a leader in a large-scale cocaine distribution conspiracy"; finding that because this 
argument was not addressed below and, therefore, not addressed by the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, it was forfeited). 
Moreover, the State has failed to support its new argument with a citation to 
authority, as the case cited by the State relates only to the question of whether this 
Court can entertain a new argument on appeal, not whether the detention of Mr. Thies 
was permissible under any recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See 
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if 
either authority or argument is lacking .... "); I.AR. 35(b)(6).2 
2 Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it 
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party' who fails to 
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, (emphasis added). This 
broader language makes sense, of course, since the holding of Zichko was based on 
the appellant's failure to comply with I.AR. 35, which requires not only that the 
appellant's brief "contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor, with 
citations to the authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied upon," 
I.AR. 35(a)(6), but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.AR. 35(b)(6). 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has defaulted the State, as the respondent, when it has 
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Finally, even if the State's argument were properly considered, it fails on its 
merits. What Officer Vogt had when he called for a drug dog, and when he extended 
Mr. Thies' detention while waiting for that drug dog, was a hunch, not a reasonable 
articulable suspicion. 3 One need only look to Officer Vogt's testimony, wherein he 
basically claimed to possess a skill set akin to "criminal radar," to see this: 
[B]ased on my training and experience, this is something that we look for 
when-particularly when we're searching a car and if you're the officer 
who is in charge of staying with the occupant or the driver of the vehicle, 
you watch their behavior. When the officer who's searching the vehicle 
gets close to some item of contraband or whatever, if they're-you know, 
where the officer is at the vehicle, say, if they're at the bumper or if they're, 
you know, at the driver's seat or something like that, if you see a change 
in behavior in the people that just came out of that vehicle when that 
officer's there, that's an indicator that there might be something there that 
they don't want to have discovered. 
(3/9/11 Tr., p.92, L.15 - p.93, L.5.) The fact is that Mr. Thies' apparent discomfort with 
officers looking into his vehicle does not evidence criminal activity any more than his 
refusal to consent to a search of that vehicle, and obviously that cannot be a factor in 
the reasonable suspicion analysis. See United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945-46 
(10th Cir. 1997). Nor can Mr. Thies' previous drug-related arrest be part of the analysis. 
State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, (Ct. App. 1990). In short, under the facts of this 
case, all Officer Vogt had was a hunch that Mr. Thies had drugs in his car and, under 
failed to comply with the requirements of I.AR. 35(b)(6). See e.g., State v. Ruiz, 150 
Idaho 469, 471 (2010) (declining to address the question of whether an error found was 
harmless because the State failed to present argument on this point). 
3 "[L]imited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible 
when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has 
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Reasonable suspicion must be based on 
specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. 
The quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is 
less than that necessary to establish probable cause. Still, reasonable suspicion 
requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." State v. 
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009) (citations omitted). 
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the Fourth Amendment, this was insufficient to prolong his detention for arrival of a drug 
dog. 
D. The State's Argument As To The Purported Inevitable Discovery Of The 
Contraband Is Not Properly Before This Court 
The State also argues for the first time on appeal that, even if Mr. Thies was 
impermissibly detained while officers waited for a drug dog, he cannot avail himself of 
the remedy embodied in the exclusionary rule because the contraband found in his car 
would have inevitably been discovered anyway. (Resp. Br., p.11 n.2.) In making this 
argument, the State reasons that because the district court concluded that neither 
Mr. Thies nor Ms. Price had a valid license, their vehicle would have remained where it 
was, such that it inevitably would have been there when the drug dog arrived. (Resp. 
Br., p.11 n.2.) This argument, however, is without merit. 
First, as discussed above (and incorporated herein by this reference), the State 
is not free to make new arguments for the first time on appeal-especially in 
suppression cases, where it is the government's burden to establish an exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
Second, had the State raised this issue below (as it should have), Mr. Thies 
might have rebutted the contention that Ms. Price could not drive the vehicle away. 
When she was being questioned by Officer Price, Ms. Price stated initially that she did 
not have a valid driver's license; she then stated that she did not have a driver's license 
at all; and then, when questioned further, seems to have backtracked on both 
statements, suggesting that she had been issued a license, but simply did not know 
whether it was suspended. (See Ex. 2, Officer Price Audio, at 16:53 - 16:57.) 
Consistent with this clarification, the State's exhibits contain a photograph of Ms. Price's 
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seemingly valid Idaho driver's license. (See Ex. 2, file 9e370bbc-5355-405c-b202-
b18e3b92f457 _ GEDC0010.) Further, had Mr. Thies been given an opportunity to 
respond to the State's "inevitable discovery" argument in the district court, he might 
have shown that someone else may have driven the vehicle away. Indeed, it seems 
that Mr. Thies and Ms. Price knew people at the scene (perhaps the parents of 
Ms. Price's children's friends, who were also there to deliver their children to driver's 
education), as they attempted communicate with people nearby, but were repeatedly 
told not to by the police. (See, e.g., Ex. 2, Officer Vogt Audio, at 4:43.) 
In light of the foregoing, even if the State's new argument can be considered on 
appeal, this Court cannot conclude with any degree of certainty that Mr. Thies' vehicle 
would have remained stationary until the drug dog arrived. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Thies 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying his 
suppression motion, and that it remand his case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2012. 
ERIK R. LEHTIN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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